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Abstract 
 
According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower 
compensation than non-family executives. One of the key driving forces behind this is the existence 
of family members who are not involved in management, but own significant fraction of shares and 
closely monitor and/or discipline those involved in management. In this paper, we show that this 
assumption falls apart if family-controlled firm is part of a large business group, where most of the 
family members take managerial positions but own little equity stakes in member firms. Using 2014 
compensation data of 564 executives in 368 family-controlled firms in Korea, we find three key 
results consistent with our prediction First, family executives are paid more than non-family 
executives (by 27% more, on average) and this family premium is pronounced in larger business 
group firms even after controlling for potential selection bias problems. Second, pay to family-
executives falls with the influence of outside family members (their aggregate ownership in the firm 
minus the ownership held by the family executive in the same firm). Third, family premium in large 
business group firms rises with group size, but falls with family’s cash flow rights. It also rises for 
group chairs, but falls with the number of board seats the family-executive holds within the group.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower 
compensation than non-family executives. Using 82 family-controlled firms in the U.S. in 
1988, McConaughy (2000) document that family CEOs are paid lower compensation than 
non-family CEOs. Likewise, Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) report 
similar findings using a sample of 253 family-controlled firms in the U.S. during 1995-98. 
Why is it the case? Explanations in the existing literature can be summarized into three. 
First, not all family members are involved in management. Some are directly involved, 
while others are not. These second group of family members, however, are not just 
bystanders. They play an important role of monitoring and disciplining family-executives, 
and because of their multidimensional and long-term relationship with family-executives, 
they are quite good at playing their role (Fama and Jensen, 1983; McConaughy, 2000). 
Thus, the compensation level of family-executives is kept at its necessary minimum.  
Second, family executives enjoy benefits that cannot be enjoyed by non-family 
executives. They receive dividends from their ownership stakes, and enjoy higher job 
security (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003). Family-executives may trade 
these benefits for lower compensation. Third, family-executives are handcuffed. Emotional 
attachment to the firm makes them unlikely to compete in the external job market, and take 
more lucrative outside offers (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003). This 
lessens the need to reward family-executives with pay packages typically paid to lure or 
retain professional executives.  
These explanations, however, are likely to be viable when the family-controlled firm is 
a stand-alone firm and not a part of a business group. With only one firm under family 
control, only a limited number of family members can take managerial positions. A large 
fraction of family members, with no managerial positions, will simply hold shares as 
outsiders. With their welfare heavily dependent on the prosperity of the firm, however, 
these outside family owners will have a strong incentive to carry out their monitoring role 
and make sure that family-executives do not overpay themselves. Availability of dividend 
income, job security, and absence of outside job offers will serve as justifications to 
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demand a low compensation level to family-executives.  
In this paper, we revisit executive compensation in family-controlled firms, and 
empirically show that family discount often found in U.S. stand-alone firms cannot be 
generalized into other types of family firms. Our prediction is that family discount 
disappears or even switches into family premium if a firm is a part of a large business group. 
We test these predictions using family-controlled firms in Korea. We believe Korea 
provides an ideal laboratory setting for a number of reasons. First, it is dominated by a wide 
range of family-controlled firms: Small stand-alone firms at one extreme and large business 
groups, also known as chaebol groups like Samsung and Hyundai Motors, at the other 
extreme. This feature allows us to investigate how family premium varies with the size of 
business group.  
Second, chaebol groups have a large number of member firms. As of April 2014, 
Samsung, Hyundai Motors, SK, LG, and Lotte – also known as the Big Five – respectively 
have 74, 56, 80, 61, and 74 member firms. Also, the extensive use of pyramiding and 
circular shareholding by chaebol groups renders family executives to have control rights 
high enough to entrench themselves from outside shareholders and to have cash flow rights 
low enough to lose interest in monitoring other family executives. These features exactly 
match with the circumstances that lead to an absence of monitoring and disciplining, not 
only among family members, but also by outside non-family shareholders.  
Third, in chaebol groups, the level of family ownership varies considerably across 
member firms. Firms on the top of a pyramid or those with controlling position over other 
member firms typically have high family ownership, whereas those in the opposite extreme 
have little (Kim, Lim, and Sung, 2007). This feature makes it possible for us to investigate 
how premium paid to family executives varies with the size of shares held in aggregate by 
family members other than the family executive under analyses. 
Using 2014 compensation data of 564 executives in 368 family-controlled firms in 
Korea, we find evidence supporting our predictions. First, we find that family-executives 
are in general paid more than non-family executives (by 27% more, on average). Second, 
we find that this family premium is pronounced in firms affiliated to large business groups. 
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Third, we find that pay to family-executives falls with the influence of outside family 
members (their aggregate ownership in the firm minus the ownership held by the family 
executive in the same firm). Fourth, we find that family premium in large business group 
firms rises with group size, but falls with family’s cash flow rights. We also find that it rises 
for group chairs, but falls with the number of board seats the family-executive holds within 
the group.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the key hypotheses of this paper. 
Section 3 gives an institutional background of executive compensation practices in Korea. 
Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategies. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
In this paper, we test a series of hypotheses that challenge the findings in the existing 
literature. We first investigate if family discount documented in the prior literature remains 
intact in a country setting where stand-alone firms are not a norm. We predict that family 
discount is likely when the family-controlled firm is a stand-alone firm and not a part of a 
business group. With only one firm under family control, only a limited number of family 
members can take managerial positions. A large fraction of family members, with no 
managerial positions, will simply hold shares as outsiders. With their welfare heavily 
dependent on the prosperity of the firm, however, these outside family owners will have a 
strong incentive to carry out their monitoring role and make sure that family-executives do 
not overpay themselves. Availability of dividend income, job security, and absence of 
outside job offers will serve as justifications to demand low compensation level to family-
executives.  
Which features of a business group may drive such an outcome? First, we predict that 
the existence of multiple firms within a business group matters. With multiple firms under 
family control, almost all the family members can be involved in management. With so 
many managerial positions available for family members, it becomes hard to find family 
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members simply holding shares as outsiders. In their absence, their monitoring and 
disciplining roles also disappear.  
Second, we predict that the outcome is partly driven by the fact that family-controlled 
business groups are typically formed by pyramiding, circular shareholdings, or a 
combination of the two, which allows families to control the whole business group without 
holding large fraction of shares in each individual member firm. In this setting, family-
executives in one member firm is not likely to closely monitor those in other member firms 
as they have little incentive to pay for the costs of monitoring. Moreover, they have control 
rights that are often high enough to effectively entrench themselves from outside 
monitoring or disciplining – such as takeover threats – by non-family shareholders.  
In the absence of monitoring and disciplining, either among family members or by 
outside non-family shareholders, we predict that family executives in large business groups 
would set their pay at a high level, leading to a premium over non-family executives.1 
Among different types of compensation – salary, bonus, non-equity based incentive pay, 
and equity-based incentive pay – we predict that family premium would be most evident in 
the case of salary. The rationale behind this prediction is that family executives are risk 
averse and have the discretion to choose one among different types of compensation to 
overpay themselves, they would naturally choose the one that does not vary with their 
performance. 
 
Hypotheses 1: Family-executives are paid more than non-family executives in family-
controlled firms  
Hypotheses 1-1: Family premium in family-controlled firms is pronounced in large 
business group firms. 
Hypotheses 1-2: Among various types of compensation, family premium in family-
controlled firms is most evident in case of salary. 
                                          
1 Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) do not explicitly investigate the existence of family-premium, 
but show that the positive association between wedge (votes controlled by insiders/equity owned by insiders) 
and pay is stronger for family-executives than for non-family executives. Also, they do not compare group 
firms versus others, which is the key feature of this paper.  
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One of the key differences between business group firms and stand-alone firms that lead to 
a family premium is the absence of family members who own shares, but do not manage. 
With their welfare heavily dependent upon the prosperity of the firm, they have a strong 
incentive to carry out their monitoring role and make sure that family-executives do not 
overpay themselves. Thus, we expect the pay to family-executives in family-controlled 
firms drop with outside family influence.2  
 
Hypotheses 2: Pay to family-executives in family-controlled firms decreases with 
outside family influence  
 
As for family-executives in large business groups, family premium can also be determined 
by group-related factors. In this paper, we investigate if the family member with the group 
chair title enjoys an extra premium. They have the highest rank among family members 
and because of this reason they are less likely to be disciplined by other family members. 
We also investigate if the number of directorship a family-executive holds within the group 
matters. If the executive receives pay from each of the firms he or she holds directorship, 
the average pay from each individual firm is likely to be smaller.  
 
Hypotheses 3: Family premium in family-controlled large business group firms rises 
for group chair. 
Hypotheses 3-1: Family premium in family-controlled large business group firms falls 
with the number of board seats the family-executive holds within the group. 
  
                                          
2 There are a number of studies that investigate the relationship between compensation and family ownership 
in family-controlled firms (Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005, Urzúa, 2009, and Amoako, Baulkaran, and 
Smith, 2011). But, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) and Urzúa (2009) do not investigate the difference 
between family- and non-family executives. Also, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) and Amoako, 
Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) do not investigate the difference between group versus non-group firms. None of 
the studies examine the influence of outside family members (aggregate ownership held by outside family 
members – ownership held by the family member involved in management).  
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3. Executive Compensation in Korea 
A. Prior Empirical Studies 
There are only a handful of papers that study the compensation of Korean executives. The 
first paper, Kato, Kim, and Lee (2007), studies the pay-performance elasticity of 246 
KOSPI200 firms during 1998-2001, and find that cash compensation of Korean executives 
is significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of elasticity is 
comparable to that of the U.S. and Japan. They further show that such overall significant 
link is driven by non-chaebol firms and no such link exists for chaebol firms.  
Garner and Kim (2013) studies the relationship between foreign share ownership and 
pay-performance sensitivity of 164 KOSPI200 firms during 2001-2006, and find that firms 
with high foreign ownership demonstrate high sensitivity, while those with low ownership 
do not, even after controlling for the potential self-selection bias. Hyun et al. (2012) studies 
the determinants and the effects of executive pay multiples (the ratio of executive pay over 
worker pay) using KOSPI firms during 2000-2009, and find that pay multiples has a 
statistically significant negative relation with subsequent operating and stock return 
performance. They show that the result is robust to corrections for endogeneity.  
B. Institutional Background 
There are a number of reasons behind this dearth of research. First, the level of executive 
pay multiple is too low to make executive compensation a core governance problem for 
Korean firms. According to some academic studies, the multiples are 5.6 for KOSPI200 
firms during 1998-2001(Kato, Kim, and Lee, 2007) and 7.6 for KOSPI firms during 2000-
2009 (Hyun et al., 2012). This is in great contrast to the 2013 U.S. figure (CEO-to-worker 
pay ratio) of 331, according to AFL-CIO. Naturally, academics paid little attention to 
executive compensation of Korean firms.  
Second, for many years, Korea government maintained a very opaque disclosure rule on 
executive compensation. According to the disclosure guidelines set by the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS), Korea’s financial supervisory authority, companies should 
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disclose aggregated cash compensation figures separately for (i) directors (excluding 
outside directors and audit committee members), (ii) outside directors (excluding outside 
directors serving audit committee), and (iii) audit committee members or internal auditors, 
but not disaggregated compensation figures at the individual director or executive level.3 
Table B in the Appendix to this paper shows an example of this disclosure using Samsung 
Electronics. This disclosure practice made it inevitable for prior researchers to use 
compensation data aggregated over multiple directors or executives.  
Third, no Korean firm discloses information concerning its executive compensation 
policy, such as a performance target, its measurement and evaluation methods, and the way 
pay relates to evaluation results. This is somewhat surprising for Korea firms that must 
secure shareholders’ approval, according to the Commercial Code, on the upper limit of 
following year’s aggregate compensation, before making payments to their directors and 
internal auditors. Unlike the case of say-on-pay in the U.S., this shareholders’ vote on the 
upper limit is legally binding in Korea. A couple of factors, including the low level of 
executive pay multiples and the indifference of Korea institutional investors allowed 
Korean firms to secure shareholders’ approval without giving out much information 
concerning compensation details. Table A in the Appendix to this paper shows an example 
how the upper limit of Samsung Electronics’ FY2013 aggregate pay is disclosed.  
C. The New Disclosure Rule 
A number of recent events, however, led Korea to make progress in its own executive 
compensation disclosure practices. First, immediately following the global financial crisis 
of 2008, a series of policy measures were taken outside of Korea with the aim of curbing 
excessive CEO pay or strengthening its transparency.4 Such movement, coupled with some 
                                          
3 Contrary to cash compensation, data on the holdings of company shares and stock options are available at 
the individual director level. 
4 Examples of international initiatives include the adoption of Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
and its Implementation Standards by the Financial Stability Board in 2009, the adoption of Pillar 3 
Disclosure Requirement for Remuneration by the Basel Committee in 2010, and the adoption of Capital 
Requirement Directive (CRD) III Remuneration Rule by the European Union in 2011. At country levels, U.S. 
adopted say-on-pay following the Dodd-Frank Act and U.K. adopted the Revised Remuneration Code 
following the Financial Services Act of 2010.  
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high executive pay incidents involving Korean firms, heighted public interest over 
executive compensation even in Korea.5 Second, academics and lawmakers expressed 
concerns over the compensation packages that executives of chaebol group member firms 
receive. They claimed that the pay is set by the group chairman to ensure their loyalty to 
him, but not to other shareholders (Hankyoreh, August 13 2013). They called for the 
disclosure of executive pay at the individual director level and actually submitted bills in 
2006 and in 2009 to mandate this. Confronted against chaebols’ resistance, however, both 
attempts failed at the National Assembly. Lastly, Japan made a move in 2010 requiring 
firms to disclose pay at the individual director level (if the total pay director receives is 
greater than 100 million Japanese yen). This left Korea to be one of the very few OECD 
countries that do not require such a disclosure practice. 
Against this backdrop, the Korean government submitted a bill revising the Capital 
Market and Financial Investment Service Act in June 2012 that eventually passed the 
National Assembly in April 2013, and promulgated in May 2013. According to the new rule, 
any director or internal auditor whose total pay exceeds 500 million Korean won 
(approximately 500 thousand U.S. dollars) must disclose its individual pay and the details 
of the criteria/methods used to set the pay in the company business reports (including 
quarterly and semi-annual reports). Table C in the Appendix to this paper shows how this is 
disclosed using Samsung Electronics as an example. 
Just a few weeks before the new rule’s effective date, 29th November 2013, Financial 
Service Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) jointly released 
guidelines on the details of the disclosure rule. First, it clarified the coverage of total pay to 
include labor income (salary, bonus, and incentive pay), retirement income, and realized 
gains from stock option exercises received since the beginning of last fiscal year.6 Second, 
it expanded the firms subject to the new rule to include all KRX listed firms, non-listed 
firms that publicly offered securities in previous years, and non-listed but externally audited 
                                          
5 For example, in 2009, Samsung Electronics paid 43.1 billion Korean won (approximately, 43 million U.S. 
dollars) to its four inside directors.  
6 Bonus and incentive pay are both cash-based compensations paid on top of salary. Incentive pay is based on 
a pre-established performance criterion, whereas bonus is not (e.g. bonus paid regularly on national holidays). 
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firms with more than 500 security investors. Third, it made it clear that directors or internal 
auditors subject to the new rule include not only those that served the full fiscal year, but 
also those dismissed before the fiscal year-end. Fourth, the FSC/FSS guideline made it 
mandatory to breakdown total pay into labor income, retirement income, and other income 
(including stock option gains), but left the disclosure of detailed criteria/methods at 
company’s discretion. Table D in the Appendix to this paper shows how these are disclosed 
using Samsung Electronics as an example.  
The first set of firms that were subject to the new rule were those that disclosed the 3rd 
quarter report after November 29 (the effective date of the new rule). But, there were not 
many. Most firms disclosed individual pay for the first time at the end of March 2014. 
These are firms with fiscal year ending in December, which take up 97% of KRX firms. 
These are the firms that constitute the sample of this paper.  
4. Sample and Methodology 
A. Sample 
We start with a sample of directors and internal auditors from KRX-listed firms that 
disclosed compensation at the individual level on March 31st, 2014.7 From this original 
sample of 641 (418 firms), we first exclude directors or internal auditors from firms whose 
fiscal year ends in March. These are insurance companies and securities firms the 
executives of which received pay exceeding 500 million Korean won over a three-quarter 
period (Q2 – Q4, 2013). We exclude them since their pay does not cover a full fiscal year, 
and therefore not comparable to those of executives from other firms.8 This drops down 
the sample size to 612 (398 firms). Second, we exclude outside directors, non-resident 
directors, and internal auditors from the sample as we do not consider them as company 
executives. In this paper, we consider only resident inside directors as executives. This 
                                          
7 This original sample includes 418 firms, which is approximately 25% of 1,666 KRX-listed firms (as of 
March 31, 2014). KRX firms include those in the KOSPI index and the KOSDAQ index.  
8 Since July 2014, however, their total pay during a full fiscal year (Q2 2013 – Q1 2014) is available. At the 
time of this writing, we are in the process of adding them into our sample.  
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drops down the sample size to 607 (395 firms). 
Finally, we limit our analyses to family-controlled firms, which we identify in the 
following steps. First, bank holding companies and their member firms are not considered 
as family-controlled. Korean law prohibits individuals from holding direct or indirect 
controlling equity stakes in bank holding companies. Second, as for member firms of 
KFTC-designated large business groups (LBGs), we follow the distinction made by the 
Commission that tracks down whether the ultimate controlling shareholder of each 
business group is an individual or a company.9 If a group is controlled by an individual, 
member firms of this group are considered as family-controlled. Large Korean chaebol 
groups, such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors, and LG, fall in this category. On the other hand, 
if a group is controlled by a company, member firms of this group are not considered as 
family-controlled. These include firms under the control of former state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), such as POSCO, KT, or KT&G that have a dispersed share ownership structure 
with no particular controlling shareholder.  
Third, as for firms outside these KFTC-designated large business groups, we identify 
their ultimate controlling shareholders ourselves by manually going through their company 
business reports and 5 percent block holder filings. We first identify their largest 
shareholders and classified a firm as not family-controlled if its largest shareholder is a 
government agency, a foreign entity, a commercial bank, or a private equity fund. If the 
largest shareholder is a non-bank domestic company, we investigate the next layer of 
control. Again, if the largest shareholder is a government agency, a foreign entity, a 
commercial bank, or a private equity fund, the original company is classified as not family 
controlled. All other firms are classified as family-controlled. Excluding non-family 
controlled firms left us with a sample of 564 executives in 368 firms.  
                                          
9 To identify firms under control, KFTC takes into account not only (i) the share holdings of a person or a 
company in question, but also those of related-parities (spouse, relatives within a certain degree of kinship, 
not-for-profit organizations and firms under a common control), (ii) the person’s or the company’s influence 
over the appointment of directors, the business entry and exit decisions, and (iii) the extent of personnel 
exchanges and related-party transactions. For detailed discussion on this, see Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007). 
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B. Methodology 
In this paper, we run a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions, where Total Pay (sum of 
salary, bonus, incentives, retirement pay, and stock option gains), in natural logarithm, is 
regressed on Family (a family executive dummy that takes a value of 1 if an executive is a 
family member, and 0 otherwise) and a battery of controls (20 control variables plus 50 
industry fixed effects). We explain the details of these controls in the next section. Equation 
(1) below shows the basic specification we use in this paper: 
 
  ijii BXFamilyPay Totalln   10  ------------------------------------------------- (1) 
 
X is a matrix of control variables, B is a vector of coefficients, and j is a fixed effect for 
industry j . A large and a statistically significant 1ˆ suggests the existence of a family 
premium. Note that coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust 
standard errors, clustered at the firm level.10 We also identify and exclude influential 
observations before estimating our regressions. Such observations are identified by the 
Cook’s distance, which measures the aggregate change in the estimated coefficients when 
each observation is left out of the estimation (Cook, 1977). Following the convention, we 
drop an observation if its value of Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the 
number of observations. 
For Equation (1) to be a valid specification, executives should be assigned randomly 
across firms independent of our outcome variable. But, for a number of reasons, this may 
not be the case. First, family members have the power and the incentive to become 
executives in member firms with high Total Pay. So, they may self-select to do so, while 
non-family executives do not as they have no such power (selective inclusion of family-
executives in high-paying firms). This will lead to a upward bias in 1ˆ (the coefficient 
estimate on Family). Second, if non-family executives are in general paid less than family-
executives, they will show up mostly in firms with high Total Pay. This is because, in low-
                                          
10 There is 1 firm with six executives, 4 firms with five executives, 7 firms with four executives, 34 firms 
with three executives, and 86 firms with two executives.  
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paying firms, they are likely to be paid less than the 500 million Korean won threshold and 
drop out from the sample (selective sample exclusion of non-family executives from low-
paying firms). This will lead to a downward bias in 1ˆ .  
Third, family-executives may show up in our sample only when they are highly paid. 
This can take place when family-executives evade pay disclosure by cutting down their 
own pay below the 500 million Korean won threshold. Since it is relatively easier to cut 
down pay below the threshold when paid slightly above, this selective sample exclusion 
may predominantly take place in firms, from which they are lowly paid (selective sample 
exclusion of family-executives from low-paying firms). This will lead to a upward bias in 
1ˆ .11 Figure 2 shows a symptom of this. If one takes a close look at the histogram of Total 
Pay in Chart C for family-executives in large business group firms, the two bins just above 
the 500 million Korean won threshold (500-600 and 600-700) have observations smaller 
than that between 700 and 800 million Korean won. 
We address these potential selection bias problems in the following way. First, we 
estimate Equation (1) after limiting our sample to those where both types of executives 
disclose compensation. In this paper, we call these samples of firms with at least one 
family-executive and at least one non-family executive as ‘paired samples.’ By dropping 
firms that have family-executives, but not non-family executives and firms that have non-
family executives, but not family-executives, we believe we can rule out, to a large extent, 
the possibility of family members self-selecting to become executives only in high-paying 
firms. By doing so, we also believe we can rule out the possibility of low paying firms 
being mostly composed of family-executives. Second, we estimate Equation (1) after 
dropping executives paid between 500 and 700 million Korean won. Given the shape of the 
distribution we see in Figure 2 Chart C, we believe that some family-executives expected to 
be paid within this range deliberately lowered their pay to evade disclosure, whereas those 
                                          
11 We do not find evidence of family executives stepping down from the board intentionally to evade 
disclosure. The fraction of deregistering family executives out of a total of registered family directors in large 
business group firms are 6.5%, 5.1%, 3.1%, and 2.4% respectively during 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. But 
interestingly, this fraction jumps to 12.64% in 2014 (to be exact, at their 2014 shareholders’ meeting in 
March). Any future study using the 2014 compensation data should be aware of this that may cause a serious 
self-selection bias problem.  
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expected to be paid above 700 million Korean won did not.  
Another challenge in using Equation (1) arises when we conduct subsample tests or 
tests using paired samples. Given the large number of control variables (20 control 
variables plus 50 industry fixed effects) we use, smaller sample size lowers our degrees of 
freedom to a level that makes it very difficult to reject our null hypothesis even if it were to 
be false. To overcome this low power problem, we adopt the method in Core, Holthausten, 
and Larker (1999) and in Gomez-Meija, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) that collapses 
the constant and the fitted value of controls into one variable called a control composite. 
Equation (2) shows the new specification: 
 
  iiii CompositeFamilyPay Totalln   1  ------------------------------------------------- (2) 
 
By construction, the estimated coefficients 1ˆ in Equation (1) and that in Equation (2) are 
identical, but with different standard errors, as Equation (2) uses a much greater degrees of 
freedom.  
Lastly, we face a challenge when interacting the family executive dummy in Equation 
(1) with ownership variables, as they are highly correlated with each other and may result 
in a multicollinearity problem. This is particularly problematic when we test how family 
premium changes with the level of executive’s share ownership or dividend income. As is 
shown in the next section, family-executives have significantly higher share ownership and 
higher dividend income than non-family executives. To address this problem, we capture 
family premium as a separate variable and regress this on ownership variables and other 
determinants. Equation (3) shows this specification. 
 
iiii eFactors OtherwnershipOPremium Family  210   ----------------------------- (3) 
 
Family Premium can be measured by the ln(Total Pay) of a family-executive minus the 
average ln(Total Pay) of non-family executives working in the same company. But, this 
reduces the sample size considerably as there is only a limited number of firms where both 
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types of executives disclose compensation (i.e. from 564 to 187). We overcome this sample 
size problem by using the predicted values of non-family executives’ average ln(Total Pay) 
in lieu of their actual values. That is, getting the fitted values of Equation (1) when the 
family-executive dummy is set to be zero. This fitted value, in effect, captures the level of 
ln(Total Pay) a non-family executive would have received if he or she is identical with the 
family-executive working in the same company in many observable ways. Given the list of 
control variables we use, they are identical in age, title, tenure, likelihood of a dismissal, 
and the number of firms giving compensation. By construction, the mean value of this 
family premium is exactly same as the coefficient value on the family-executive dummy in 
Equation (1). 
5. Empirical Results 
A. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 gives the definitions of each variable we use in this paper. Panel A lists the 
definitions of compensation-related variables and Panels B, C, and D, respectively list the 
definitions of executive-, firm-, and group-level variables. Compensation-related variables 
come from Economic Reform Research Institute (ERRI) that manually collected the data 
from each company’s business report. 12  Many other variables, including Dismiss, 
Ownership, Group Dividend, No. of Directorship, Wage, No. of Board Meetings, are also 
manually collected.   
One of the key variables of interest is LBG, which take a value of 1 if a firm is a 
member of a large business group, designated by Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) 
either in 2013 or in 2014, and 0 otherwise. We use both years, 2013 and 2014, because 
KFTC designates large business groups each year not at year-end but in April. Also note 
that KFTC designates a business group as large if the aggregate asset size of its member 
firms is greater than 5 trillion Korean won.13 Since we include only family-controlled firms 
                                          
12 Business reports can be electronically retrieved from the Data Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer System 
(DART), which is administered by Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). 
13 To be more precise, KFTC uses a concept called fair assets, which is the book value of assets for non-
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in our sample, large business groups in our sample are large family-controlled business 
groups, which are more popularly known as chaebols. Note that for regulatory reasons 
KFTC has been designating these groups since 1987. For more details on KFTC’s 
designation of large business groups firms, see Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007).  
Cash Flow Rights and Wedge are also obtained following the methods introduced in 
Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007). Cash flow right is the sum of controlling family’s direct and 
indirect ownership. Family includes the controlling shareholder, its spouse, and relatives 
within certain degrees of kinship (six with the controlling shareholder and four with the 
spouse). Wedge is the difference between controlling family’s control (or voting) rights and 
cash flow rights. Control rights is the fraction of common shares held by family members, 
non-family executives, affiliated not-for profit organizations, and member firms.  
Figure 1 shows a series of bar charts that compare the total pay (in million Korean won, 
which is approximately 1 thousand U.S. dollars) of family and non-family executives in 
family-controlled firms. In Chart A, we do not require each sample firms to have both types 
of executives, whereas in Chart B, we do. Each chart has three pairs of bars, the first 
including a combined sample of large business group firms and others, the second including 
only large business group firms, and the third including the remaining. Notice that sample 
size shrinks considerably from 564 to 187 when we move from Chart A to Chart B (paired 
sample). Also notice that there are slightly less large business group firms (n = 254) than 
others (n = 310) in our sample. 
The bar charts in Figure 1 show evidence consistent with our prediction that family 
premium exists and that this premium is pronounced in large business group firms 
(Hypotheses 1 and 1-1). If we focus on Chart B that uses paired sample to correct for 
potential selection bias problems, the overall family premium is approximately 860 million 
Korean won. This is equivalent to 76% of non-family executives’ average total pay of 1,133 
million Korean won. If we move to the subsample of large business group firms, the 
premium increases to 1,280 million Korean won, which is 114% of non-family executives’ 
average total pay of 1,125 million Korean won.   
                                                                                                                              
financial companies, but book value of equity for financial companies.  
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Table 2 gives summary statistics of each variable used in this paper. In Panel A, we give 
summary statistics of our compensation-related variables separately for family-executives 
and non-family executives. Mean or median value of each type of compensation tells us 
that family premium is driven by salary, which is again consistent with our prediction 
(Hypothesis 1-2). Also notice that there is a family discount for retirement pay and gains 
from stock option exercises. This is not surprising since family-executives seldom retire 
and by Korean law are not eligible to receive stock option grants. Another noteworthy 
finding is about executive pay multiples. They average 22-25 and reach up to 167-273. The 
figures are much greater than those of Kato, Kim, and Lee (2007) and Hyun et al. (2012) as 
we do not have executives paid less than 500 million Korean won in our sample.   
Panel B compares executive-level variables between family-executives and non-family 
executives. One can see that family-executives are slightly older and are more likely to be a 
representative director. Note that representative director is a legal institution unique in 
Korea that is equivalent to a chief executive officer (CEO) in other countries. They are 
resident executives who sit on the board and represent the company. But, a given firm may 
have multiple representative directors. On other executive-level variables, there is a 
considerable difference between family-executives and non-family executives. Family 
executives are more likely to have longer tenure, less likely to be dismissed, hold more 
directorships (paying and non-paying), hold greater fraction of company shares, receive 
greater amount of dividend income from the company, and more likely to be a business 
group chairman.  
Panel C compares firm-level variables between large business group firms and others. 
One can see that large business group firms, compared to others, are larger, older, but less 
profitable with lower stock returns. They have lower family ownership, but higher wedge 
between control and cash flow rights. They have higher employees’ wage, larger board size, 
higher fraction of outside directors, and higher foreign ownership. Panel D gives the 
summary statistics of group size, in natural logarithm, for large business groups designated 
by KFTC either in 2013 or in 2014. The panel is split between groups below the sample 
median (16.31) and those above. One can see that there is a considerable variation in group 
 
 - 18 - 
size. 
B. Family Discount or Family Premium? 
We first test if family-executives are paid more than non-family executives in general. That 
is, testing the existence of a family premium. We estimate Equation (1), where ln(Total Pay) 
is regressed on the family-executive dummy and a host of executive- and firm-level control 
variables. Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard 
errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are identified and dropped if 
Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the number of observations.  
Executive-level controls include the executive’s age, the title (1 if a representative 
director, and 0 otherwise), the tenure (number of years served as the firm’s director since 
1998, which is the first year DART provides company business reports on-line), the 
executive’s dismissed during fiscal year, and the number of firms, from which the executive 
receive total compensation above 500 million Korean won. Table 1 gives detailed definition 
for each of these variables. We expect age, tenure, title, and the number of paying firms be 
positively associated with total pay. The coefficient on the dismissal dummy is, however, à 
priori ambiguous. The coefficient is likely to be negative if dismissed directors receive a 
pay falling short of a full-year’s compensation. It may, however, be positive if dismissed 
directors receive a large retirement pay, which is also a part of total pay.  
Firm-level controls include firm size, firm performance (ROA), firm risk (firm age, 
R&D/Sales, systematic risk, unsystematic risk), ownership (family cash flow rights and 
wedge), employee’s wage, and governance (outside director ratio, board size, number of 
board meetings, and foreign ownership). Again, Table 1 gives detailed definition for each of 
these variables. We expect firm size, firm performance, R&D/Sales, systematic risk, 
unsystematic risk, and employee’s wage to be associated positively with total pay. As for 
firm age, cash flow rights and governance, we expect them to be associated negatively.14 
                                          
14 As for the relationship between family cash flow rights and compensation, the results in the existing 
literature are mixed. Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) show that CEO-pay increases and then falls with 
either CEO or family ownership (inverse U-shape), whereas Urzúa (2009) shows a strong negative relation 
between chair and board compensation and controllers’ cash-flow rights in group-affiliated firms. Barontini 
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We also expect systematic risk that measures uncontrollable business risk to be associated 
with pay more strongly than unsystematic risk. We have no prior expectation for wedge.15 
In the Korean context, where dual class equity is not permitted, higher wedge basically 
means higher share ownership by affiliated firms. If it entrenches the controlling family 
from outside shareholders, it may increase the pay to family-executives. But, if it 
strengthens outside monitoring by the affiliated firms, it may decrease the pay to non-
family executives.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results. Column (2) adds 2-digit industry fixed effects to 
column (1). Column (3) switches 2-digit to 4-digit industry fixed effects (comparable to 2-
digit US SIC). Column (4) adds two more firm performance variables (lagged ROA and 
stock return) and two more firm risk variables (systematic risk and unsystematic risk). 
Regardless of the specification we use, the coefficient on the family-executive dummy is 
positive, economically large, stable, and statistically significant, at the 1 percent level. The 
coefficient of 0.2710 in column (4) means that family-executives receive a total pay that is 
on average 27.1% greater than that received by non-family executives (notice that our 
dependent variable is in natural logarithm). This is much greater than the difference we see 
in our univariate analyses in Figure 1 (Chart A).  
Most of the control variable coefficients are also consistent with our prior expectations. 
Executive’s age, title, tenure, firm size, ROA, R&D/sale, employee’s wage are associated 
positively with total pay, whereas firm age, family cash flow rights and board size are 
associated negatively. The dismissal dummy takes a positive coefficient, suggesting that 
dismissed executives may have received a large retirement pay. Also, the coefficient on 
wedge is negative, suggesting the possibility of affiliated firms exerting pressure on the pay 
                                                                                                                              
and Bozzi also show a strong negative association between the two. Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) 
study closely held Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998. Urzúa (2009) study a 6-year sample of controller-
dominated, concentrated-ownership firms in Chile. Barontini and Bozzi (2011) use firms listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2002.  
15 The results in the existing literature are also mixed. Amoako, Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) show that 
executives are paid more from dual-class companies than from single-class companies, using companies with 
concentrated control listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1998 and 2006. Barontini and 
Bozzi (2011), on the other hand, find a strong negative association between wedge and executive 
compensation using firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2002.  
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to non-family executives. All other variables are insignificant.  
C. Robustness Checks on the Existence of Family Premium 
Next, in Table 4, we conduct a series of robustness checks to our findings in Table 3. In 
column (1), we re-estimate the regression in Table 3 column (4) after removing executives 
with total pay above the 99th percentile value (6,213 million Korean won) as outliers. The 
distribution of total pay is heavily skewed and a small number of extremely highly paid 
family-executives might drive the result. In column (2), we remove the heads of large 
business groups (i.e. group chairperson). Because of their rank, they are usually paid more 
than others, but the position is never taken by non-family executives. This may inflate the 
family premium. In column (3), we scale executive’s total pay with the average wage of 
company employees (i.e. executive pay multiple). In column (4), we remove the executives 
receiving retirement pay or realizing capital gains from stock option exercises, as these 
types of compensation are one time in nature and show up mostly among non-family 
executives. In column (5), we remove executives with total pay less than 700 million 
Korean won to address the selection bias problem that may arise when family-executives 
who are paid slight above the 500 million Korean won threshold deliberately cut down their 
own pay below the threshold to evade disclosure requirement. In column (6), we limit our 
sample to those where both types of executives disclose compensation (i.e. paired sample) 
to address the selection bias problems that may arise when family members choose to 
become executives in firms with high total pay or non-family executives drop out of sample 
firms with low total pay as they are paid below the 500 million Korean won threshold from 
these firms. 
The coefficients on family-executive dummy are positive, economically large, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. The coefficients in columns 
(1) and (3) are almost identical to our base regression result in Table 3 column (4), 
suggesting that the removal of executives with total pay above the 99 percentile value or 
replacing total pay with executive pay multiples hardly make a difference. On the other 
hand, the coefficients in columns (2) and (5) are slightly smaller, indicating that heads of 
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large business groups do receive extra pay and that some family executives do cut down 
their own pay below the threshold to evade pay disclosure. In contrast, the coefficient in 
columns (4) is larger, indicating that retirement pay or stock option gain has a tendency of 
inflating total pay for non-family executives. Lastly, the coefficient on column (6) is 
considerably larger, suggesting that non-family executives drop out of our sample mostly 
from firms that tend to pay low, and that this causes a downward bias in the coefficient 
estimate in our base regression. 
In Table 5, we regress each type of compensation (salary, bonus, incentives, retirement 
pay, stock option gains, and others) on the same set of regressors we use in column (4) of 
Table 3 to see if family premium we find in Tables 3 and 4 exist across different types of 
compensation. The results show that family premium exits only in salary. This is consistent 
with our prediction that risk-averse family executives would pay themselves a premium in 
the form of compensation that is not at risk (Hypothesis 1-2). As for retirement pay and 
gains from stock options, we find a family discount. But, given the large fraction of salary 
out of total pay (71% for family-executives and 39% for non-family executives), the family 
premium in salary dominates the family discount in retirement pay or gains from stock 
options, which is why we see a family premium in total pay in Tables 3 and 4. 
D. Does Business Group Size Matter? 
In Table 6, we test if the level of family premium is greater in large business group (LBG) 
firms than in others. As discussed in Section 2, we predict that family premium is larger if a 
firm is a part of a business group than those are not. But, we do not have information 
enabling us to identify stand-alone firms. As an alternative, we compare KFTC-designated 
large business group firms against other set of firms that may include not only stand-alone 
firms, but also firms affiliated to smaller sized business groups. This alternative approach 
can be justified on the ground that key forces behind family premium is stronger in larger 
business group firms than in smaller group firms. First, the number and the size of member 
firms are greater within large business groups than within smaller groups. Recall that KFTC 
designates a business group as large if the aggregate asset size of its member firms, which 
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is a function of number and size of member firms, is greater than 5 trillion Korean won. 
Second, the level of family cash flow rights in each individual member firm is lower in 
large business group firms than in smaller group firms. Table 2 shows that the average 
family cash flow right in large business group firms is 13% whereas that in other firms is 
37%.  
In column (1), we interact the large business group firm dummy (LBG) with the family-
executive dummy using our base regression of column (4) in Table 3. As expected, the 
interaction term is positive, economically large, and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient value of 0.119 on the family-executive dummy and the coefficient of 0.253 
on the interaction term suggest that family premium is 37.2% for large business group firms 
and 11.9% for other firms. In the remaining columns, we conduct a serious of robustness 
checks. The results show that the interaction terms are either significant at the 1% level 
(column (6)), 5% level (columns (2) and (4)), or 10% level (columns (3), (5), and (7). The 
economic magnitude ranges from 19.7p to 34.8p. In column (7), we collapse the constant 
and the fitted values of other controls into a single composite index variable to save the 
regression’s degrees of freedom. 
The large business group dummy we use in Table 6, however, is a crude measure of 
business group size as it does not differentiate business groups within the KFTC-designated 
groups. In fact, our summary statistics in Table 2 reveal that group size ranges from 15.48 
to 19.61. This corresponds to a range between 5.3 and 331 trillion Korean won. In Table 7, 
we conduct tests similar to those in Table 6, but limit our sample to firms affiliated to 
KFTC-designated large business groups and replace the large business group dummy with 
the group size variable. When measuring group size, we simply take the figure announced 
by KFTC. As noted earlier, KFTC measures the size of a business group by summing up 
the fair assets of its member firms. For non-financial firms, fair asset is equal to book asset 
value. But, for financial firms, KFTC deliberately uses book equity value in lieu of book 
asset value as their high financial leverage would disport the rankings.  
The results in Table 7 reveal that business group size matters in explaining family 
premium. The interaction terms between group size and financial-executive dummy is 
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positive, economically large, and statistically significant at 1% level across all 
specifications. Again, in column (7), we collapse the constant and the fitted values of other 
controls into a single composite index variable to save the regression’s degrees of freedom. 
A coefficient of -0.021 (virtually 0) on ln(Group Size) and a coefficient of 0.133 on the 
interaction term in column (1) suggests that a 100 percentage change in group size (e.g., a 
change from Dongkuk Steel Group that ranks 22nd to LS Group that ranks 13th) leads to a 
13.1 percentage change in the total pay of family-executives, but no change in that of non-
family executives.  
E. The Importance of Other Family Ownership 
One of the key differences between business group firms and stand-alone firms that lead to 
a family premium is the absence of family members who own shares, but do not manage. 
As discussed earlier, with their welfare heavily dependent upon the prosperity of the firm, 
they have a strong incentive to carry out their monitoring role and make sure that family-
executives do not overpay themselves. In this subsection, we investigate if the presence of 
these outside family members makes a difference. 
For each family executive, we capture the influence of outside family members by their 
aggregate ownership in the firm concerned minus the ownership held by the family 
executive in the same firm. Using the variable names in Table 1, it is (Other Family 
Ownership II – Ownership). We regress ln(Total Pay) on this newly generated variable, 
named Outside Family Influence, and a set of control variables similar to those in our base 
regression (Table 3 column (4)). We include all the control variables that appear in the base 
regression except for Cash Flow Rights and Wedge that are considerably correlated with the 
Outside Family Influence variable. Since we are investigating the influence of outside 
family members on family-executives, we limit our sample to family-executives. We 
collapse the constant and the fitted values of other controls into a single composite index 
variable to save the regression’s degrees of freedom. Coefficient standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential 
observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is 
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the number of observations. 
Table 8 shows the results. In column (1), we include Ownership and Other Family 
Ownership separately. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on Other Family 
Ownership is negative (Hypothesis 2). In column (2), we replace these variables with 
Outside Family Influence, which reports a coefficient that is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of -0.25 suggests that a 1-standard deviation 
change in Outside Family Influence (0.2) leads to a 5 percent fall in Total Pay. In column 
(4), we include ln(Dividend Income + 1) to see if there is any substitution effect between 
executive compensation and dividend income. The coefficient is small and statistically 
insignificant. In column (5), we interact ln(Dividend Income + 1) and Outside Family 
Influence to see if the substitution effect exists at higher values of Outside Family Influence. 
The interaction term is, however, positive, invalidating the substitution effect even at higher 
values of Outside Family Influence.16 In remaining columns, we replace Outside Family 
Influence with its dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if Other Family Ownership II is 
greater than Ownership and 0 otherwise. We find similar results.  
F. Other Determinants of Family Premium 
In this subsection, we investigate the determinants of family premium using large business 
group firms. We restrict the sample to large business groups. By doing so, we can 
investigate the influence of group-related variables, the information of which is available 
only for these firms. Our left-hand side variable is Family Premium, which is ln(Total Pay) 
of a family-executive minus its predicted value for non-family executives who are 
otherwise identical with the family-executive. As discussed earlier, we obtain this predicted 
value by getting the fitted value of Equation (1) when the family-executive dummy is set to 
be zero.  
Table 9 reports the results. In column (1), we regress Family Premium on Group Size, 
Dividend Income, Ownership, Other Family Ownership, Chair, and No. of Directorship. 
                                          
16 This is in contrast to the findings in Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) and Urzúa (2009). They both 
show that the level of compensation relative to dividend income rises with the fall of CEO or family 
ownership. 
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The detailed definitions of these variables appear in Table 1. Consistent with our earlier 
results in Table 7, Family Premium is associated positively with Group Size across all 
specifications (Hypothesis 3). The coefficient is economically meaningful and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. A coefficient of 0.13 in column (1) suggests that a 1-standard 
deviation increase (1.12) in Group Size leads to a 0.15 increase in Family Premium. This is 
44% of Family Premium’s mean value of 0.34. Table 9 also shows that Family Premium is 
positively associated with the family-executive’s dividend income from the firm. This is 
consistent with our finding in Table 8 that there is no substitution effect between 
compensation and dividend income for family executives. Group Dividend, on the other 
hand, is insignificant across all specifications.  
Table 9 also shows that Family Premium is negatively associated with family ownership 
variables. This is consistent to our findings in Table 8. Columns (1), (2), and (3) 
respectively use Other Family Ownership II, Family Ownership II, and Cash Flow Rights II. 
The coefficients on these variables are negative, economically meaningful, and statistically 
significant either at 1% or at 5% level. A coefficient of -1.002 in column (1) suggests that a 
1-standard deviation increase (0.1) in Other Family Ownership II leads to a 0.1 fall in 
Family Premium. This is 30% of Family Premium’s mean value of 0.34. Table 9 also shows 
that Family Premium is positively associated with Chair, which takes a value of 1 if family-
executive is a group chair and 0 otherwise. This is consistent with the fact that group chairs 
have the highest rank among family members and because of this are less likely to be 
disciplined by other family members (Hypothesis 3-1). A coefficient of 0.198 suggests that 
a group chair has a Family Premium that is 19.8%p higher than other family-executives. 
Table 9 also reports that Family Premium is negatively associated with the number of 
directorship an executive holds within the group (Hypothesis 3-1). If the executive receives 
pay from each of the firms he or she holds directorship, the average pay from each firm is 
likely to be small. This is what we find in Table 9. The coefficient of -0.27 suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase (0.57) in ln(No. of Directorship) leads to a 0.15 fall in 
Family Premium. This is 45% of Family Premium’s mean value of 0.34.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we challenge the existing literature and show that family-executives can be 
paid more than non-family executives in family-controlled firms if firms under 
investigation are a part of a large business group. Using 2014 compensation data of 564 
executives in 368 family-controlled firms in Korea, we find evidence supporting our 
predictions. First, we find that family-executives are in general paid more than non-family 
executives (by 27% more, on average), even after controlling for potential selection bias 
problems. Second, we find that this family premium is driven by salary, and not by other 
types of compensation. Third, we find that this family premium is pronounced in firms 
affiliated to large business groups. Fourth we find that pay to family-executives falls with 
the influence of outside family members (their aggregate ownership in the firm minus the 
ownership held by the family executive in the same firm). Fifth, we find that family 
premium in large business group firms rises with group size, but falls with family’s cash 
flow rights. It also rises for group chairs, but falls with the number of board seats the 
family-executive holds within the group. 
Our results suggest that family-executives in large business group firms are paid more 
than necessary and they are using executive compensation as means of expropriating other 
minority shareholders. This calls for strengthening the current disclosure requirements in 
Korea. There are three areas of improvement. First, FSS should give more detailed 
guidelines on how companies disclose the criteria/methods of pay. At present, FSS gives 
full discretion to the companies, and as a result, very few companies disclose the details of 
their pay criteria and methods. Second, the Capital Market and Financial Investment 
Service Act or its presidential decree should be revised so that the minimum amount of total 
pay subject to disclosure is lowered down to 100 million Korean won, which is a level 
consistent with the U.S. threshold of 100 thousand U.S. dollars. This will prevent family-
executives from cutting down their pay below the threshold to evade their disclosure 
requirement. Third, the Capital Market and Financial Investment Service Act should be 
revised so that non-registered executives also become subject to pay disclosure as long as 
they hold executive positions and are one of the highest paid executives (e.g. one among 
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the top give highest paid executives). This will prevent family-executives from stepping 
down from the board to evade pay disclosure.     
One conceivable extension of this research is investigating the various evasive 
behaviors family-executives exhibit to be exempt from the pay disclosure requirement. In 
this paper, we already discussed two possibilities. On is remaining as a director, but cutting 
down the pay below the threshold that exempts disclosure. Another is stepping down from 
the board. We also saw symptoms of such evasive behaviors. The distribution of total pay 
shows a relatively low density in the region just above the threshold. This suggests that 
some family-executives intentionally lower their pay to evade pay disclosure. Also, the 
fraction of deregistering family-executives out of a total of registered family-executives in 
the previous year jumps sharply at the 2014 shareholders’ meeting. This suggests that some 
family-directors do step down from the board to evade pay disclosure.  
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Figure 1: Family Executives vs. Non-Family Executives 
 
Bar charts of total compensation (in million Korean won, which is approximately 1 thousand U.S. dollars) of 
family and non-family executives in family-controlled firms. In Chart B, we restrict the sample to those that 
have at least one in each type of pay-disclosing executives (family executive and non-family executive). The 
first pair of bars in each chart includes the full sample of firms (n = 564 in Chart A, n = 187 in Chart B), the 
second pair limits to member firms of large business groups (n = 254 in Chart A, n = 111 in Chart B), 
designated by Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and the last includes all others (n = 310 in Chart A, n = 
76 in Chart B).  
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Figure 2: Distribution of Executive Pay 
 
Histogram of total compensation (in million Korean won, which is approximately 1 thousand US dollars) for a subsample of family executives (Chart 
A), non-family executives (Chart B), family executives in large business group firms (Chart C), and family executives in other firms (Chart D).  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions  
 
Panel A: Compensation-related Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Total Pay Total compensation in million Korean won (approximately 1 thousand 
US dollars). Source: Business reports of each company retrieved from 
Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART) administered by 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). Individual components of total 
compensation also from the same source. 
Salary Salary (in million Korean won)  
Bonus Bonus (in million Korean won)  
	 Cash incentives (in million Korean)  

		 Gains from stock option exercise (in million Korean)  
Retirement Retirement pay (in million Korean won)  
Others All other pay (in million Korean won)  
Pay Multiples Total compensation divided by employees’ average wage, in natural 
logarithm 
 
Panel B: Executive-level Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Family 1 if the executive is a family member, 0 otherwise. To be classified as a 
family member, he or she has to be a relative to the controlling 
shareholder (the degree of kinship must be six or less if blood 
relationship exists with the controlling shareholder and six or less if 
blood relationship exists with the controlling shareholder’s spouse). 
Sources: Board member filings retrieved from Online Provision of 
Enterprises Information System (OPNI) administered by Korea Fair 
Trade Commission (KFTC) and business group and 5% block holding 
files retrieved from DART 
Executive Age Executive’s age as of 2013. Source: Business reports from each company 
retrieved from Total Solution 2000 (TS2000) compiled by Korea Listed 
Companies Association (KLCA). 
Representative Director 1 if the executive is a representative director, 0 otherwise. Source: 
Business reports of each company retrieved from DART. 
Tenure Number of years served as director in the firm. Source: Business reports 
of each company retrieved from DART. 
Dismiss 1 if dismissed any time during 2013, 0 otherwise. Source: Business 
reports of each company retrieved from DART. 
No. of Paying Firms Number of firms, from which the executive received total compensation 
above 500 million Korean won (approximately 500 thousand US dollars). 
Source: Business reports of each company retrieved from DART. 
Ownership Fraction of common shares held by the executive at year-end 2013. 
Source: Business reports of each company retrieved from DART. 
Dividend Income Cash dividend received (in million Korean won). Source: firm’s total 
cash dividend retrieved from TS2000. 
Chair 1 if chairman of the business group, 0 otherwise. Available only for large 
business group firms. Source: KFTC press releases 
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Group Dividend Cash dividend received (in million Korean won) by the executive from 
firms within the business group. Available only for large business group 
firms. Sources: OPNI and DART 
No. of Directorship Number of member firms, at which the executive hold directorship. 
Available only for large business group firms. Sources: OPNI and 
TS2000 
 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Family Firm 1 if a firm is a family firm, 0 otherwise. Sources: OPNI and DART 
LBG 1 if a firm is a member of a large business group, designated by KFTC 
either in April 2013 or in April 2014, 0 otherwise. Source: Korea Fair 
Trade Commission press releases 
Firm Size Total assets (in thousand Korean won). Source: TS2000 
Firm Age Years since firm establishment. Source: TS2000 
ROA Net income divided by total assets at year-end 2013. Source: TS2000 
ROA (1-yr lag) Net income divided by total assets at year-end 2012. Source: TS2000 
Stock Returns Log return over 2013. Source: DataGuide, a financial database solution 
compiled by FnGuide, a Korea-based financial data/software company. 
Systematic Risk Standard deviation of KOSPI monthly returns over a 5-year period 
(2008-2013) multiplied by the firm’s beta (estimated by a market model 
using KOSPI as market portfolio and using the same monthly returns 
over the same time period). 
Unsystematic Risk Standard deviation of residual returns from the above market model. 
R&D/Sales Research and development (R&D) expenditure divided by total sales. 0 
for financial companies. Source: TS2000 
Family Ownership I Fraction of common shares held by family members at year-end 2013. 
Source: Business reports of each company retrieved from DART. 
Family Ownership II Fraction of common shares held by family members and non-family 
executives at year-end 2013. Source: Business reports of each company 
retrieved from DART. 
Other Family Ownership I Family Ownership I – Ownership 
Other Family Ownership II Family Ownership II – Ownership 
Cash Flow Rights I Family members’ (excluding non-family executives’) cash flow rights (in 
fraction terms) at year-end 2013. Available only for large business group 
firms. Sources: OPNI and DART 
Outside Family Influence  Other Family Ownership II - Ownership 
Outside Family Influence Dummy 1 if Outside Family Influence is positive and 0 otherwise. 
Cash Flow Rights II Family members’ (including non-family executives’) cash flow rights (in 
fraction terms) at year-end 2013. Sources: OPNI and DART 
 		 Control rights (fraction of common shares held by family members, non-
family executives, affiliated not-for-profit organizations, and member 
firms) at year-end 2013 minus Cash Flow Rights II at year-end 2013. 
Sources: TS2000 
Wage	 Employees’ average wage (in million Korean won). Source: DART 
Board Size Number of directors at year-end 2013. Sources: OPNI and TS2000 
Outside Director Ratio Number of outside directors as a fraction of Board Size at year-end 2013. 
Source: TS2000 
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No. of Board Meetings Number of board meetings in 2013. If multiple meetings held in a single 
day, they are treated as one meeting. Source: DART 
Foreign Ownership Common shares held by foreigners at 2013 year-end, in fractions. 
Source: DataGuide 
Industry Fixed Effects Constructed from 4-digit Korea Standard Industrial Classification 
(KSIC), equivalent to 2-digit US Standard Industrial Classification. 
Source: Statistics Korea 
 
Panel D: Group-level Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Group Size Sum of member firms’ fair assets (in billion Korea won). Fair assets 
equal to total assets in case of non-financial member firms and to book 
equity in case of financial member firms. Source: Korea Fair Trade 
Commission press releases 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Compensation-related Variables 
 Family Executives Non-family Executives 
N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total Pay 319 1,253 874 1,158 500 11,204 245 1,236 841 1,094 502 8,179
Salary 319 891 698 709 0 5,600 245 487 426 321 0 1,788
Bonus 319 174 6 340 0 2,400 245 207 115 352 0 2,981
Incentive 319 137 0 721 0 8,800 245 146 0 413 0 3,444
Retirement 319 40 0 237 0 2,735 245 228 0 578 0 4,587
Stock Option 319 0 0 0 0 0 245 139 0 705 0 8,000
Others 319 11 0 95 0 1400 245 28 0 134 0 1,490
Pay Multiples 319 25 19 20 7 167 245 22 16 23 6 273
 
Panel B: Executive-level Variables 
 Family Executives Non-family Executives 
N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Executive Age 319 59.08 58.00 10.21 34.00 91.00 245 56.95 58.00 6.65 33.00 75.00
Representative Director 319 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 245 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Tenure 319 10.91 12.00 4.88 1.00 26.00 245 5.54 4.00 3.88 0.00 16.00
Dismiss 319 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 245 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
No. of Paying Firms 319 1.38 1.00 0.72 1.00 4.00 245 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Ownership 319 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.62 245 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12
Dividend Income 319 927 124 2792 0 27,629 245 18 0 98 0 982
Chair 103 0.46 0 0.50 0 1 151 0 0 0 0 0
Group Dividend 100 6,328 2,513 10,813 0 54,559 129 5.39 0 19.56 0 188.99
No. of Directorship 103 4.57 4 3.28 0 13 150 1.65 1 1.69 0 11
 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables 
 Large Business Group (LBG) Firms Other Firms 
N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
ln(Firm Size) 134 14.85 14.85 1.36 11.50 18.86 234 12.40 12.31 0.97 9.95 15.07
Firm Age 134 36.57 37.50 18.98 1.00 83.00 234 29.03 26.00 16.71 0.00 89.00
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ROA 134 0.00 0.02 0.18 -1.51 0.71 234 0.04 0.04 0.22 -1.03 2.84
ROA (1-yr lag) 134 0.05 0.03 0.29 -0.35 3.36 233 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.45 0.52
Stock Returns 133 -0.05 -0.02 0.33 -1.18 0.70 230 0.04 0.06 0.42 -2.45 1.20
Systematic Risk 133 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.13 230 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.13
Unsystematic Risk 133 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.22 230 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.26
R&D/Sales 134 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.16 234 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.35
Family Ownership I 134 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.76 234 0.29 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.80
Family Ownership II 134 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.76 234 0.29 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.80
Other Family Ownership I 134 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.76 234 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.75
Other Family Ownership II 134 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.76 234 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.75
Cash Flow Rights I 133 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.76 234 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.80
Cash Flow Rights II 133 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.76 226 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.80
Wedge 133 0.28 0.30 0.19 0.00 0.79 226 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.57
Wage 134 62.09 62.00 15.86 26.00 105.00 234 46.72 44.00 14.39 19.60 135.40
Board Size 134 7.96 8.00 2.24 3.00 14.00 234 5.56 5.00 2.12 2.00 12.00
Outside Director Ratio 134 0.50 0.56 0.14 0.00 0.75 231 0.30 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.67
No. of Board Meetings 134 13.09 10.00 9.04 3.00 70.00 234 13.07 11.00 9.77 1.00 82.00
Foreign Ownership 134 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.56 234 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.59
 
Panel D: Group-level Variables 
 Group Size > Median (16.31) Group Size < Median (16.31) 
N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
ln(Group Size) 18 17.58 17.32 0.93 16.46 19.62 19 15.90 15.87 0.25 15.48 16.31
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Table 3: Family Premium in Total Pay 
In this table, we report regression results where we regress ln(Total Pay) on family-executive dummy and a 
set of executive- and firm-level control variables. In column (2), we add 2-digit industry fixed effects. In 
column (3), we replace 2-digit with 4-digit industry fixed effects. In column (4), we add a number of firm 
performance variables. Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater 
than 4/N, where N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Executive-level Variables     
     
 Family 0.2582*** 0.2763*** 0.2877*** 0.2710*** 
  (5.01) (5.04) (4.94) (4.55) 
 ln(Executive Age) 0.1362 0.0540 0.2684* 0.2577 
  (0.96) (0.36) (1.67) (1.55) 
 Representative Director 0.0773* 0.1142*** 0.1476*** 0.1538*** 
  (1.93) (2.66) (3.63) (3.80) 
 ln(Tenure + 1) 0.0774** 0.0952** 0.0619 0.0643 
  (2.17) (2.35) (1.49) (1.54) 
 Dismiss 0.1663*** 0.1955*** 0.1898*** 0.1571** 
  (3.09) (3.49) (3.18) (2.57) 
 No. of Paying Firms 0.0725* 0.0412 0.0393 0.0503 
  (1.69) (0.97) (0.94) (1.20) 
Firm-level Variables     
     
 ln(Firm Size) 0.1377*** 0.1664*** 0.1429*** 0.1363*** 
  (5.87) (6.03) (4.80) (4.25) 
 ln(Firm Age + 1) -0.0699** -0.0603* -0.0452 -0.0234 
  (-2.45) (-1.91) (-1.40) (-0.68) 
 R&D/Sales 1.4228*** 2.1145*** 1.9502*** 2.0392*** 
  (2.73) (3.43) (3.17) (3.28) 
 Cash Flow Rights I -0.3748*** -0.4798*** -0.6026*** -0.5262*** 
  (-2.64) (-3.14) (-3.61) (-3.06) 
 Wedge -0.6308*** -0.6210*** -0.6925*** -0.6681*** 
  (-4.22) (-3.91) (-4.31) (-4.07) 
 ln(Wage) 0.2613*** 0.2802*** 0.2835*** 0.3031*** 
  (3.54) (3.25) (2.66) (2.80) 
 Outside Director Ratio 0.0367 -0.1285 -0.0422 -0.0317 
  (0.25) (-0.78) (-0.24) (-0.17) 
 ln(Board Size) -0.0971 -0.1562** -0.1259* -0.1311* 
  (-1.59) (-2.29) (-1.92) (-1.96) 
 ln(No. of Board Meetings) 0.0344 0.0337 0.0259 0.0186 
  (1.16) (0.97) (0.72) (0.49) 
 Foreign Ownership 0.1171 -0.0354 0.0653 0.1017 
  (0.59) (-0.17) (0.28) (0.43) 
 ROA 0.3423** 0.2471* 0.4615*** 0.5378*** 
  (2.41) (1.68) (3.14) (3.44) 
 ROA (1-yr lag)    0.0831 
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     (1.25) 
 Stock Return    -0.1538** 
     (-2.15) 
 Systematic Risk    -0.2276 
     (-0.19) 
 Unsystematic Risk    0.0888 
     (0.13) 
Constant 3.3617*** 3.5450*** 3.7424*** 2.7806*** 
 (5.48) (5.24) (4.32) (3.02) 
Industry Fixed Effects - 2-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
No. of Observations 506 507 501 497 
Adjusted R-squared 0.324 0.332 0.346 0.339 
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Table 4: Family Premium in Total Pay – Robustness Check 
In this table, we report regression results where we conduct a series of robustness tests. As for column (7), we collapse the constant and the fitted 
values of other controls into a single composite index variable to save regression’s degrees of freedom following Core, Holthausten, and Larker (1999). 
Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are identified 
and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Limited to 
LBG Firms 
with group 
fixed effects 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
extreme 
values 
Exclude 
group 
chairman 
Pay 
multiples 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
retirement pay 
or option 
gains 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
total pay < 
700 mil. won
Limit to 
paired 
Sample 
Family 0.6843*** 0.2719*** 0.2257*** 0.2712*** 0.3965*** 0.2309*** 0.5077*** 
 (5.70) (4.65) (3.67) (4.55) (5.43) (2.92) (6.99) 
Constant, other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y  
Industry Fixed Effects 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
Composite Index       Y 
No. of Observations 216 500 463 498 396 341 162 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635 0.317 0.274 0.300 0.425 0.300 0.669 
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Table 5: Family Premium in Different Types of Pay 
In this table, we report regression results where we regress different types of executive compensation, in 
natural logarithm, on the same set of control variables that appear in our base regression (Table 3 column (4)). 
Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. 
Influential observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the 
number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Salary Bonus Incentive Retirement Options Others 
Executive-level Variables       
       
 Family 0.662*** 0.033 0.042 -0.635*** -0.106* -0.193 
  (7.92) (0.11) (0.16) (-3.25) (-1.78) (-1.43) 
 ln(Executive Age) 0.438** -0.330 -0.433 -0.393 -0.191* -0.195 
  (2.31) (-0.45) (-0.72) (-1.06) (-1.70) (-1.10) 
 Rep. Director 0.119** -0.021 0.140 0.191 -0.006 -0.030 
  (2.39) (-0.09) (0.78) (1.41) (-0.23) (-0.55) 
 ln(Tenure + 1) 0.009 0.110 -0.113 0.079 0.055 0.000 
  (0.17) (0.46) (-0.51) (0.55) (1.61) (0.01) 
 Dismiss -0.397*** -0.094 -0.595** 3.674*** 0.006 0.119 
  (-4.74) (-0.37) (-2.16) (11.58) (0.14) (1.01) 
 No. of Paying Firms 0.091* -0.400* -0.343* -0.097 0.009 0.054 
  (1.66) (-1.80) (-1.96) (-0.66) (0.63) (1.00) 
Firm-level Variables       
       
 ln(Firm Size) 0.179*** 0.309 -0.054 -0.138* -0.032 -0.046 
  (5.03) (1.59) (-0.31) (-1.77) (-1.36) (-0.65) 
 ln(Firm Age + 1) -0.054 -0.322 0.228 -0.168* -0.004 -0.017 
  (-1.27) (-1.48) (1.07) (-1.70) (-0.29) (-0.29) 
 R&D/Sales 1.639** -12.440*** -3.654 -2.388 -0.479* -0.304 
  (2.13) (-3.60) (-1.63) (-1.37) (-1.70) (-0.36) 
 Cash Flow Rights I -0.232 -0.693 -2.572** 0.112 -0.149 0.151 
  (-1.11) (-0.55) (-2.25) (0.18) (-1.18) (0.50) 
 Wedge -0.308 0.528 -1.650 -0.436 0.083 0.026 
  (-1.47) (0.46) (-1.55) (-0.74) (0.57) (0.12) 
 ln(Wage) 0.067 1.822*** 2.134*** -0.241 0.023 0.143 
  (0.56) (3.34) (3.61) (-0.80) (0.32) (0.69) 
 Outside Dir. Ratio -0.049 -1.461 0.730 0.770 0.114 0.468* 
  (-0.21) (-1.33) (0.70) (1.62) (0.92) (1.81) 
 ln(Board Size) -0.107 -0.310 -0.071 -0.213 -0.038 -0.069 
  (-1.06) (-0.64) (-0.17) (-0.88) (-1.14) (-0.60) 
 ln(No. of Meetings) -0.038 0.169 -0.364* 0.204* -0.007 -0.011 
  (-0.70) (0.66) (-1.66) (1.82) (-0.68) (-0.22) 
 Foreign Ownership 0.152 0.072 -1.044 0.301 0.076 0.304 
  (0.46) (0.05) (-0.75) (0.46) (0.56) (0.83) 
 ROA 0.204* 0.989 -0.601 0.071 -0.028 0.635* 
  (1.67) (0.83) (-0.59) (0.24) (-0.41) (1.86) 
 ROA (1-yr lag) -0.256*** 1.397* 1.371*** 0.131 -0.038 0.078 
  (-4.99) (1.97) (3.85) (1.28) (-1.14) (0.60) 
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 Stock Return -0.019 0.684* -0.358 0.317 0.029 -0.127 
  (-0.23) (1.69) (-1.08) (1.62) (0.99) (-1.17) 
 Systematic Risk 0.173 -4.224 -7.956 -1.162 -0.928 1.518 
  (0.12) (-0.63) (-1.21) (-0.39) (-1.48) (0.81) 
 Unsystematic Risk 0.192 -1.204 -2.093 -1.619 0.118 0.250 
  (0.20) (-0.25) (-0.52) (-0.77) (0.37) (0.23) 
Constant 1.783** -4.727 1.589 5.050** 0.950 0.689 
 (2.04) (-1.12) (0.42) (2.24) (1.64) (0.81) 
Industry Fixed Effects 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
No. of Observations 516 512 509 506 519 504 
Adjusted R-squared 0.498 0.306 0.238 0.553 0.830 0.028 
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Table 6: Large Business Group Affiliation and Family Premium 
In this table, we report regression results where we interact the family-executive dummy with the large business group (LBG) dummy. We use the same 
set of control variables that appear in our base regression (Table 3 column (4)). Column (2) is the base regression. Column (1) omits the interaction 
term. Columns (3) to (8) conducts a series of robustness tests. As for column (8), we collapse the constant and the fitted values of other controls 
(including industry dummies) into a single composite index variable following Core, Holthausten, and Larker (1999) to save regression’s degrees of 
freedom. Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are 
identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No 
Interactions
Base 
regression 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
extreme 
values 
Exclude 
group 
chairman 
Pay 
multiples 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
retirement 
pay or 
option gains
Exclude 
executives 
with 
total pay < 
700 mil. 
won 
Limit to 
paired 
sample 
Family 0.272*** 0.119* 0.166*** 0.110 0.120* 0.282*** 0.029 0.354** 
 (4.55) (1.72) (2.76) (1.56) (1.73) (3.28) (0.33) (2.53) 
  x LBG  0.253** 0.232** 0.197* 0.253** 0.222* 0.348*** 0.315* 
  (2.48) (2.33) (1.78) (2.48) (1.82) (2.83) (1.96) 
LBG 0.026 -0.142 -0.105 -0.091 -0.143 -0.147 -0.385*** -0.296*** 
 (0.32) (-1.56) (-1.20) (-1.00) (-1.56) (-1.33) (-2.81) (-3.82) 
Constant, other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  
Industry Fixed Effects 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
Composite Index        Y 
No. of Observations 499 501 501 468 500 394 342 164 
Adjusted R-squared 0.336 0.312 0.303 0.248 0.297 0.433 0.343 0.680 
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Table 7: Size of Large Business Groups and Family Premium 
In this table, we report regression results where we limit the sample to large business group firms and replace the large business group dummy with the 
group size variable (demeaned at 48.5 trillion Korean won). Column (2) is the base regression. Column (1) omits the interaction term. Columns (3) to 
(8) conducts a series of robustness tests. To save degrees of freedom, we collapse the constant and the fitted values of other controls (including industry 
dummies) into a single composite index variable following Core, Holthausten, and Larker (1999). Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, 
where N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No 
Interactions
Base 
regression 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
extreme 
values 
Exclude 
group 
chairman 
Pay 
multiples 
Exclude 
executives 
with 
retirement 
pay or 
option gains
Exclude 
executives 
with 
total pay < 
700 mil. 
won 
Limit to 
paired 
sample 
Family 0.507*** 0.637*** 0.603*** 0.734*** 0.638*** 0.694*** 0.622*** 0.879*** 
 (9.65) (11.91) (11.86) (13.04) (12.02) (15.27) (10.94) (13.74) 
  x ln(Group Size)  0.133*** 0.096** 0.204*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.159*** 
  (3.36) (2.46) (6.26) (3.28) (3.67) (3.02) (3.47) 
ln(Group Size) 0.046** -0.021 0.049*** 0.116*** -0.021 0.039* 0.020 0.101** 
 (2.46) (-1.12) (2.73) (7.61) (-1.14) (1.97) (1.16) (4.58) 
Composite Index Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Observations 233 232 227 185 232 194 173 100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640 0.681 0.651 0.716 0.649 0.749 0.698 0.816 
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Table 8: Importance of Other Family Ownership 
In this table, we report regression results where we regress ln(Total Pay) on ownership and dividend related variables, and a set of control variables 
similar to those in our base regression (Table 3 column (4)). We include all the control variables that appear in the base regression except for Cash Flow 
Rights I and Wedge. The sample is restricted to family-executives. To save degrees of freedom, we collapse the constant and the fitted values of other 
controls (including industry dummies) into a single composite index variable following Core, Holthausten, and Larker (1999). Coefficient standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Influential observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s 
distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Family-Executives Non-Family Executives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership 0.182     -1.194   
 (1.09)     (-1.11)   
Other Family Ownership I -0.330*     -0.071   
 (-1.95)     (-0.45)   
Outside Family Influence  -0.252** -0.249**    -0.075  
  (-2.38) (-2.30)    (-0.48)  
Outside Family Influence Dummy    -0.127*** -0.131***   0.052 
    (-2.75) (-2.69)   (0.95) 
ln(Dividend Income + 1)   0.003  0.002    
   (0.36)  (0.23)    
Composite Index Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Observations 279 279 279 283 281 219 219 221 
Adjusted R-squared 0.431 0.446 0.440 0.462 0.450 0.488 0.539 0.497 
 
 
 - 45 - 
Table 9: Determinants of Family Premium within Large Business Groups 
In this table, we report regression results where we regress family premium on a number of determinants. 
Family premium is ln(Total Pay) of family-executive minus its predicted value for non-family executives who 
are otherwise identical with the family-executive. The sample is restricted to large business group firms. 
Coefficient standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. 
Influential observations are identified and dropped if Cook’s distance is greater than 4/N, where N is the 
number of observations. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ln(Group Size) 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.100** 
 (3.38) (2.69) (2.52) 
ln(Dividend Income + 1) 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 
 (4.31) (4.37) (3.82) 
ln(Group Dividend + 1) -0.014 -0.010 -0.003 
 (-1.02) (-0.72) (-0.21) 
Ownership -0.604  
 (-1.62)  
Other Family Ownership II -1.002**  
 (-2.11)  
Family Ownership II -0.806***  
 (-2.69)  
Cash Flow Rights II -0.717** 
 (-2.37) 
Chair 0.198** 0.194** 0.198** 
 (2.43) (2.37) (2.39) 
ln(No. of Directorship) -0.270*** -0.252*** -0.274*** 
 (-3.03) (-2.87) (-3.07) 
Constant Y Y Y 
No. of Observations 91 89 88 
Adjusted R-squared 0.247 0.240 0.250 
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Appendix: Sample Disclosure of Executive Compensation in Korea 
 
In this appendix, we show how Korean firms disclose their executive pay using an example 
of 2013 company business report of Samsung Electronics. Table A demonstrates how the 
upper limit of FY2013 aggregate compensation is disclosed. Table B illustrates how total 
and average pays to different groups of executives are disclosed. Table C displays how pays 
to individual directors are disclosed. Notice that former directors are also subject to the 
disclosure requirement. Table D shows how the criteria and the methods of individual pay 
are disclosed. Here, we use the pay to Mr. Oh-Hyun Kwon as an example. Since companies 
have full discretion over this last table, detailed disclosure items vary considerably from 
one company to another. Tables C and D are newly required disclosure tables since the 
2013 company business reports.  
Table A: Disclosure of Upper Limit 
Unit: million Korean won 
 Number of Directors Upper Limit 
Inside Directors 4  
Outside Directors 2  
Audit Committee Members 3  
Total 9 38,000 
Table B: Disclosure of Total and Average Pays 
Unit: million Korean won 
 Number of Directors Total Pay Average Pay 
Inside Directors 4 26,356 6,589 
Outside Directors 2 179 89 
Audit Committee Members 3 279 93 
Total 9 26,814  
Table C: Disclosure of Individual Pay 
Unit: million Korean won 
Name Title Total Pay 
Kwon, Oh-Hyun Representative Director 6,773 
Yoon, Book-Keun Representative Director 5,089 
Shin, Jong-Kyun Representative Director 6,213 
Lee, Sang-Hoon Director 3,734 
Choi, Gee-Sung Former Representative Director 3,970 
Ju-Hwa Yoon Former Director 577 
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Table D: Disclosure of Individual Pay Criteria and Methods 
(Oh-Hyun Kwon, CEO of Samsung Electronics) 
Unit: million Korean won 
Breakdown Item Amount Criteria/Methods 
Labor Income Salary 1,788 · Board of directors 
 Bonus 2,034 · Seasonal (Seollal/Chuseok) bonuses 
(100% of monthly salary) 
· 2-time target incentive (0-400% of 
monthly salary) set by the CEO based 
on each business unit’s target 
achievement  
· 1-time performance incentive (0-70% 
of yearly base compensation) set by the 
CEO based on companywide 
achievement of earnings target 
Retirement Income  - - 
Other Income Stock Option - - 
 Others 2,951 · Special Bonus & Welfare 
Total  6,773  
 
 
